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THE LOGICAL ROLE OF THE ARGUMENT FROM 
TIME IN THE TAHAFUT’S SECOND PROOF FOR 
THE WORLD’S PRE-ETERNITY 
IKTRODUCTIOS 
Of the four proofs reported and discussed by Al-Ghazili in his 
Tahafut al-Faldsifah (The Collapse of the Philosophers) for the world’s 
pre-eternity, the second proof 1 has generally been regarded as the ar- 
gument from time, 2 and with some justification. For, to begin with, 
the proof makes use of Aristotle’s argument in the Physics, 3 and this 
argument is logically central to the whole proof. Moreover, and per- 
haps for this very reason, the discussions that follow both in Al-Gha- 
zHli’s Tahdfut al-Faldsifah and Ibn Rushd’s Tahafut al-Taluifut 4 con- 
centrate on this aspect of the proof, the argument from time. For time, 
according to the Aristotelian argument, is the measure of motion, and 
if time is eternal, motion must be eternal. The proof makes explicit what 
this in turn entails, the eternity of that which is in motion, i.e., the 
world. Al-GhazBli in his response to the proof neither challenges the 
Aristotelian definition of time as the measure of motion 5 nor does he 
question the legitimacy of the inference of the eternity of motion from 
the eternity of time. 6 He only argues that time and the world were 
created together: God precedes the world in a non-temporal sense of 
“before.” 7 The rest of the discussions in the Talujfuts take up this 
issue and debate the question whether time can have a beginning. 8 
For Ibn Rushd, a first moment of time is iinpossible since the moment, 
the “now,” unlike the physical point, is not static and must allvays have 
a “before“ as well as an “after.” 9 
But this very pre-occupation with the nature of time detracts from 
the actual role the argument from time plays in the proof. For the proof 
has to be considered in the peculiar manner in which it is formulated in 
Al-Ghazfili, Tahdfuf al-Fol6sifaia, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut, 192j) ,  pp. j1-52. 
AI-Gharili himself seems so to regard it. TF, p. So. 
Physics, viii, Ch. I, 2j1b 10. 
TF. pp. 52-66; Ibn Rushd, Talicifitt af-Tok6Jitt7 ed. 31. Bouyges (Beirut, 1930), 
pp. 64-97. This Il-ork will be abhrevkted “TT.” 
hl-Ghazili gives a subjective theory of time. TF,  pp. 54 i f .  But this does not 
necessarily rule out the theor?- that time is tfie measure of motion. See Ihn Rushd’s 
coniment on -41-GhazPli’s theory. TT,  pp. 73-74. 
See G. F. Hourani, “Thc Dialogue between XI-Gliazfili and the Philosophers 
on the Origin of the \I:orId,” The Musliin World, XLVIII, No. 3 (July, IgjS), 
pp; 189-9, and St. Thomas aquinas, Siciriiiia Coritra Goifiles, Bk. 11, Ch. 36, Sec. 6.  
’ TF, PP. 52-53. ’ This includes a second proof of the philosophers to demonstrate tixie’s past 
eternity and its debate. TF, pp. 60-66; TT ,  pp. 83-97. 
TT, pp. 76-80. 
This edition will be abbreviated “TF.” 
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the Tahiifut. Al-Ghazgli did not reproduce the Aristotelian argument 
pure and simple. His source is Ibn Sing’s argument in his Nujat, 10 and 
it is this formulation of Ibn Sin5 that we must contend with. I t  is true 
that Al-GhazHli in reproducing Ibn SinH’s proof effects some changes, 
elaborates and clarifies some points, and omits part of the argument 
relegating it to another place in the subsequent discussion. 11 But he is 
faithful in giving the essence of Ibn SinH’s argument, and, what to our 
purpose is most significant, in reproducing the logical structure of the 
proof 12 and in introducing the argument from time in the same manner 
that Ibn Sing reproduced it. In  both the Najdt and the Tahiifut the 
argument from time is introduced in conjunction with the problem of 
God’s priority to the world. The eternity of God is assumed throughout 
the proof and is used to argue for the eternity of time. 
The entire proof in the TuhBfut is formulated in such fashion that, 
taken at its face value, it does not constitute a proof a: all. For it 
abounds with hidden premises and implied consequences-indeed, the 
proof‘s major conclusion, the world’s pre-eternity, is implied, as we shall 
show. It  is only when these hidden premises and implied consequences 
are fully drawn out that the proof can be exhibited for what it actually 
is. a syllogism of a specific type. The argument from time is only part 
of :his syllogism. In itself it is not a conclusive argument for the world’s 
pre-eternity. Il’hat it does prove, however, is that God’s priority cannot 
be Temporal, and this, as we shall show, is the minor premise of the 
syllogism. ll-hen this is realized, the proof is absolved from what other- 
wise would be a glaring circularity. Moreover, it becomes clear that the 
central metaphysical issue in the proof is not the nature of time, but the 
nature of God’s causality. 
l‘i-e will analyze the proof to exhibit its syllogistic structure and 
to bring out the points mentioned above. In our analysis we will not 
question the soundness of the argument from time in the proof. We 
will grant its soundness for the sake of argument since our main purpose 
is to demonstrate the logical role it plays in a larger syllogistic con- 
lo Ibn Sin%, Al-A’ajdt (Cairo, 1938), pp. 256-57. 
I* In the Tahdfzcf God’s priority to the world is either essential or temporal, and 
these. as we shall show, are exclusive. This exclusiveness is not at  first sight clear 
in the A’aj6t’s proof. There Ibn Sin2 says that God is prior to the world either in 
essence or in essence (dhci f )  and time. The subsequent argument, however (where, 
incidentally, Ibn Sin% anticipates and gives an answer to Al-Ghaz%li’s theory that 
God‘s precedence to the world and time only means the existence of one essence 
and then two essences without this implying a temporal relation - T F ,  pp. 52-53), 
S ~ O T ~ S  that Ibn Sin5 did not mean to conjoin essential priority x-ith temporal. 
11x1 s!nZ simply means that God is either prior essentially or prior in existence 
and :!me. Al-Ghazsli hv omitting the verbal conjunction avoids the ambiguity. 
H e  further makes vivid hy sDecific examples what Ihn Sing means h s  essential 
priori? where cause and effect are simultaneous. Al-GhazHli omits a large portion 
of Ibn SinH’s proof which consists of an analysis of the meaning of Rdna, “was” 
in the statement that God “was” before the world, which for Ibn Sin2 implies the 
existence of time. This AI-Ghazgli reproduces in the subsequent discussion and 
criticizes it. TF. DP. ;.3-;4. 
See helow. n a e  13. 
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text. Moreover, in the proof God’s eternity is spoken of as though it is 
an eternity in time. This is the point Ibn Rushd takes exception to in 
his immediate comment on the proof and which leads him to reject the 
proof as a undemonstrative argument. 13 Again, we will not quarrel 
with the proof on this issue. 
I .  THE STRUCTURE O F  T H E  PROOF 
The proof Al-Ghazsli reports in his Tahnfut and attributes to the 
They claim that whoever asserts that the world is posterior to 
God and God prior to the world can only mean one of two things : 14 
He can mean that God’s priority to the world is essential, not 
temporal, like the priority of one to two which is a priorit1 by 
nature although one and two can coexist in the same time; and 
like priority of cause to effect, as for example, the priority of a 
person’s movement to the movement of his shadow that follows 
him, the hand’s movement to the movement of the ring, and the 
hand’s movement in water to the movement of the water. All these 
are examples of simultaneous movements but some are causes, 
some effects. For it is said that the shadow moves by the movement 
of the person and the water moves by the moveinent of the hand, 
philosophers runs as follows : 
‘3 TT, pp. 64-65. 
l4 The sequence of conditions in the Arabic text runs as follows: 
“They claim that whoever asserts that the world is posterior to God and 
God prior to the world can only mean cifkcr (iiiimo-) that His  priority is 
essential, not temporal ... and if ( f a  in) this is what is meant by God’s priority 
to the world then ... and if ( x u  itz) it is meant that God is prior to the world. 
not essentially, but in time, then ...” (Italics mine.) 
Tnstead of the expected “or,”(wa imi rd  or ax,) that nornially follo\vs the iirst 
“either” ( imi18) ,  the first condition is repeated in the first “and if” and the 
second alternative it g i x n  in the second “and if.” or “and ‘when,”’ as we 
render it in our translation. But it is clear that the alternatives are two, are 
exclusive, as we shall show, and are restricted to this nuniber. The expression 
16 yaklilli, literally “not empty of,” which might be rendered “without ex- 
ception” and which comes immediately after the first iriwrd in the text, is used 
in disjunctive syllogisms to restrict the number of alternatives to those stated in the 
argument. The expression mdnicaf nl-khulzi, literally “that which prohibits emp- 
tiness,’’ is used to designate the two out of the three kinds of disjunctive syllogisms 
discussed in Arabic philosophy whose alternatives are restricted. See below, p. 9 
and note IS. 
“bloreover, with what does the First precede his created acts? By His  
essence or by time? If by His  essence alone ... then ... if He precedes the 
world, not in essence alone, but in essence and time in that H e  was without 
the world and motion ... then there was time before motion and time ...” 
(Italics mine.) 
The disjunctive form is also very clearly brought out by Ibn Rushd in his brief 
“The substance of what they say is that God if He is prior to the world is 
eifhcr causally, not temporally, prior, as a person is prior to his shadow 
or is temporally prior as the builder is  prior to the wall. and if His  priority 
is like the priority of a person to his shadow then ,.. and if He is temporally 
prior then ...” TT, pp, 64-6j, (Italics mine.) 
The disjunctive form of the argument is very clear in Ibn Sini’s proof : 
summary and criticism of the proof : 
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and it is not said that the person moves by the movement of the sha- 
dow and the hand by the movement of the water although these 
movements are simultaneous. If this is what is meant by God’s 
priority to the world, then it follows necessarily that they are 
either both temporal or both eternal and it would be impossible 
for one to be eternal, the other temporal. 
I f ,  on the other hand, it is meant that God is prior to the world 
and time, not essentially, but in time, then before the existence of 
the world and time a time would have existed in which the world 
did not exist, inasmuch as nonexistence preceded existence, and 
God would have preceded the world by a long duration, limited in 
the direction of its ending but having no limit in the direction of 
its beginning. Thus before the existence of time, eternal time 
would have existed, and this is contradictory, and for this reason 
the affirmation of the finitude of time is repugnant. When, there- 
fore, time, which is the expression of the measure of motion, is 
necessarily eternal, motion is necessarily eternal and that which is 
in motion and through whose duration in motion time endures is 
necessarily eternal. 
A preliminary remark is necessary before we proceed to analyze 
the discourse above: On first sight one might take the last sentence 
above as the conclusion of the proof as a whole. But this would overlook 
the tentative nature of this conclusion. As formulated above, the argu- 
ment for the eternity of time is not a deduction from the nature of 
time and motion as in Aristotle, and following him, Ibn Rushd, hlai- 
monides, and Aquinas. 15 It  is not deduced from the argument that 
time must always have a “before” and an “after.” I t  is deduced from 
the premise that God is eternal and the stcppositiotz of His temporal 
priority to the world. 
The discourse above gives two alternative ways in which God might 
be prior to the world. The alternatives are restricted 16 and exclusive. 
They are exclusive because the discussion of essential priority in the 
first part of the discourse clearly shows that essential priority implies 
temporal co-existence. This necessarily excludes the temporal priority 
or posteriorly of one or the other. Many of the consequences of these 
two alternatives are drawn. But not all the consequences are made ex- 
plicit. Moreover, some premises are left implied. The discourse, as it 
stands, without all its implied assumptions and consequences fully 
drawn out, constitutes only a hypothetical disjunctive proposition (qa- 
diyyalz shurtiyyah munfqilah). 1 7  Hence, to exhibit the discourse for 
TT,  pp. 76-80: Maimonides, The Guide fo r  the Pwblered, Introduction to 
the second part, propositions xv and xxvi, and Ch. 14, “first method”: Aquinas, 
Sunrma Confra Gentiles, Bk. 11, Ch. 3.7, sec. 6.  
16 See ahove, note 14. 
See Al-GhazHli, Maq@id al-Faldsifa (Cairo, 19.36), p. 19. 
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what it actually is, a syllogism, we must make explicit what lies im- 
plicit. 
In the discussion of the first alternative, God’s essential priority to 
the world, the explicit consequence is that such a priority implies tem- 
poral co-existence. If God is eternal, the world is eternal, and if God is 
temporal, the world is temporal. The implied premise here is that God is 
eternal. The assumption that God is eternal is made use of, as we shall 
see, in the discussion of the second alternative, God’s temporal priority. 
To prove that the world is eternal, all that is necessary is to prove that 
God’s priority is essential. 
The argument from time comes in the discussion of the consequence 
of the second alternative, the supposition that God’s priority is tem- 
poral. If we suppose God’s priority temporal, the argument in essence 
states, then we must conclude that the world is eternal. For God would 
then precede the world by infinite time and infinite time implies the 
world’s eternity. Clearly here we have the assumption that God is 
eternal; otherwise He  would not precede the world by infinite time. 
Infinite time in turn implies the world’s eternity since time is the mea- 
sure o i  motion and does not exist without motion. But in such an 
argument we do not arrive at the world’s eternity because as a matter of 
fact God temporally precedes the world. Indeed, He  cannot. For i f  both 
God and the world are eternal, then God cannot precede the world by 
time. The argument here is a reductio ad absawduiii : of we suppose God’s 
priority temporal, we would have to conclude its contradictory that 
God‘s priority cannot be temporal. Hence, God’s priority cannot be 
temporal. But this conclusion is left implicit, and yet, it is the con- 
clusion which the argument from time, taken independently from what 
precedes it in the proof, actually proves. Independently, the argument 
from time as formulated in the Tahcifut does not prove the world’s 
eternity. 
This is shown by the simple fact that one might insist that there 
can be another kind of priority which is not temporal and which would 
yet allow the creation of a world finite in its past temporal extension. 
Indeed, this is precisely what Al-GhazPli insists upon in his rejection 
of the proof. Thus the argument from time would only prove the 
world’s eternity i f  it is stipulated beforehand that there can be no other 
kind of priority which is non-temporal and which yet would allow a 
non-erernal world. And this is what the preceding parts of the proof 
stipulate. For the number of possible priorities are restricted to two, 
essential and temporal. Essential priority implies temporal co-existence 
of God and the world, so that if God is eternal, the world is eternal. 
That God is eternal is a premise assumed throughout the proof and 
accepted by all the disputants. Hence, without setting this condition, 
the argument from time does not prove the world’s pre-eternity. But it 
does, taken independently, prove the impossibility of God’s temporal 
prioriry to the world. I t  does that because any priority posited other 
than a temporal priority would in the very nature of the case not be a 
teniporal priority. 
Hence, the argument from time, independently of the rest of the 
proof, proves one thing : the impossibility of God’s temporal priority. 
But what does this mean? It  means that one of the two disjuncts in 
the disjunctive proposition has been proven false. But to deny one of 
the two disjuncts is to affirm the other. In effect we have here a full- 
fledged syllogism in which one disjunct is proved through the disproof 
of the other. And indeed we have here an example of the type of 
syllogism Ibn Sin2 terms “a hypothetical ‘truly’ disjunctive syllogism” 
(qiyds istithn2iyy slmrfiyy wcnfasil haqtqqcstan) 18 in which the alter- 
natives are restricted and exclusive and where, when, as in the case 
above, the alternatives are two, the denial of one results in the affir- 
mation of the other, and the affirmation of one results in the denial 
of the other. The argument froin time in effect, has proven that God’s 
priority is essential, but only through this disjunctive syIlogistic ar- 
gument. The world’s pre-eternity in turn is the implied consequence 
of the affirmation of God’s essential priority and the hidden premise 
that God is eternal. 
11. FURTHER AXALYSIS 
Rcal and Apparent Circularity. - A circularity has been pointed out 
in the minor premise, in the Aristotelian argument:19 To infer the 
eternity of motion from the eternity of time assumes the point at issue, 
the eternity of motion. For time is defined as the measure of motion. 
Hence, we can only infer the eternity of time from the eternity of 
mo:ion. V’e cannot reverse the process and infer the eternity of motion 
from the eternity of time. This seems a just criticism of the -4ristoteiian 
argument. However, in this analysis, as we have pointed out, we are 
chiefly concerned with the structure of the proof as a whole and with 
the role the argument from time plays in the syllogism. IYhether the 
argument from time is sound or not is important in itself. But it is not 
relevant to our purpose here. 
However, there seems to be another circularity in the proof that 
See Sins, Kitdb al-Islzdrdt wa-1-Tanbiltdt, ed. J. Forget (Leyden, 1892), pp. 
29, 78-79. 
The “truly” disjunctive syllogism is one that restricts the alternatives and pro- 
hibits conjunction : vidnicnt a/-khulzi wa-l-janiC. The lion truly disjunciive are two 
in number. The first of these restricts only but does not prohibit conjunction: 
vifiriiCaf al-kliidtr inpat .  This is identical with iyliat is normally regarded nowadays 
as the disjunctive syllogism where the relation “or” is inclusive. Here only t!ie 
denial of one of the two alternatives results in the affirmation of the other. The 
second type of non-truly disjunctive syllogism does not restrict the number of 
alternatives bu! pro!iibits conjunction : iircinict7t a l - jm ic faqa t .  Here o:iIy the ?.f!iT- 
mation of one of the alternatives results in the denial of the rest. See also Al-Gba- 
zsli. MiCydr al-ciliii (Cairo, 1329 A.H., pp. 6;-66, 89-90, and dfa! iak  nl .’\’a.;cr 
(Cairo, no date), up. 42-4. 
See above, note 6. 
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is relevant because it involves the structure of the proof as a whole. 
If the proof as a whole is regarded, as it should be, as a disjunctive 
syllogism, and if at the same time the argument from time is regarded 
as in itself proving both the impossibility of God’s temporal priority 
to the world and the world’s pre-eternity, then we are caught in the 
following circularity : The world’s pre-eternity is the consequence of 
God’s essential priority but this essential priority itself is a consequence 
of the world’s pre-eternity. 
But our analysis of the proof’s structure absolves it from this cir- 
cularity. For, as we have shown, the argument from time by itself 
does not prove the world’s pre-eternity. I t  only proves that God’s 
priority cannot be temporal. Hence, the essential priority of God is 
not deduced from the world’s pre-eternity, and thus no circularity is 
involved. 
T h e  Centrality of the Disjunctive Form. - One might attempt to 
approach the proof differently and completely disregard the disjunctive 
form. One might concentrate on the argument from time and regard 
it as a proof for both the world’s pre-eternity and God’s essential 
priority. But this, to begin with, is not warranted by the very wording 
of the proof. Furthermore, it is not warranted logically. To begin with, 
the argunient from time does not prove by itself the world’s pre-eternity. 
However, i f  for the sake of argument we concede that it does, it would 
still have to show that God is prior to the world in the same sense that 
the discussion of God’s essential priority in the proof says that God is 
prior. And this it does not do. For  the argument from time would only 
prove that God and the world must co-exist i f  God is eternal. If God is 
supposed to be not eternal, He can be temporally prior to the world. 
For then He would not precede the world by infinite time. But in the 
discussion of essential priority in the proof God and the world must 
co-exist in the same time regardless of whether God is eternal or tem- 
poral. Indeed, i f  God is not eternal the world is not eternal precisely 
because it must co-exist with Him. This is implied by the very concept 
of essential priority discussed in the proof. Hence the argument from 
time would not show that God is prior to the world in the same sense 
as the discussion of essential priority in the proof says that God is 
prior. The argument from time, in effect, taken by itself, neither proves 
the world‘s eternity nor God’s essential priority articulated in the proof. 
Hence, if we disregard the disjunctive form, we have no argument. 
The Metaphysical Implications of the Proof. - Our last analysis 
above leads us into the metaphysical implications of the proof. The 
argument from time, if again, for the sake of argument, is to be regar- 
ded as  in itself a proof for the world’s pre-eternity, would say some- 
thing quite different about the relation of God to the world. The reason 
for the impossibility of God’s temporal priority to the world would lie 
in the fact that time, and hence the world, is eternal. The necessity lies 
outside God. It  lies in the nature of time, motion, and the world. In 
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effect, the argument says that God, if He creates at all, because of the 
nature of time, must create eternally. I t  does not say that God by His 
nature necessarily creates and, since He is eternal, His creation is 
necessarily eternal. Indeed, the concept of God as cause here is irre- 
levant. God need not be the cause of the world but if He  is eternal 
the world would have to be eternal since otherwise He would precede 
the world by infinite time. 
But the world’s pre-eternity as a consequence of God’s essential 
priority to the world relegates necessity to God. Here it is not merely 
the case that i f  God creates at all His creation must be eternal. Rather, 
God necessarily creates the world and His creation is therefore neces- 
sarily eternal. Otherwise why should the discussion of essential priority 
in the proof show that even if God is temporal the world must co-exist 
with Him? Clearly the notion of essential priority implies that God’s 
act must be co-extensive wit6 His being, and hence, the temporal post- 
eriority of the world to God is impossible. Now, in the first proof and 
the discussions that follow it, several arguments were given to show the 
impossibility of the world’s temporal posteriority to God, all, in one 
way or another, expressing determinism. IVe will list some of these: 
( I )  The temporal posteriority of the world implies the occurrence of a 
determinant in time which in turn implies the occurrence o i  yet another 
determinant to explain the occurrence of the first, and the second 
deteminent implies the existence of yet another determinant, and so on 
ad injinitzcnz, and this is impossible. 20 (2) Temporal posteriority im- 
plies change in God. 2 1  (3) I t  implies the delay of the eiiect after the 
cause when where is no intervening obstacle. 22 (4) It implies choice 
between exactly similar moments of time when there is iiorhing to dif- 
fereniiate and specify one moment from another. 23 Of these, (3) in- 
dicates the doctrine that God necessarily creates, implied in the proof 
abox-e. and indeed it is this issue which Ibn Rushd brings up again in 
his answer to Al-Ghiz%li’s theory that the world and time were created 
together at a finite moment in the past. 24 A cause with all its con- 
ditions fulfilled must have its effect, and i f  there is no obstacle the 
effect cannot be delayed. Now in the case o i  God the cause is the Divine 
Will. The Divine Will is eternal. hloreover, for the philosophers (as 
well as for the Muctazila) the Divine Will is identical with the Divine 
Essence, and for Ibn Sin5 the Divine Essence and the Divine Existence 
are one and the same. Hence God by His very Essence creates the 
world. The world is the necessitated effect of an eternal changeless 
cause, and hence inust be eternal. I t  cannot be temporally posterior to 
God. 
2o TF, p. 23. 
21 TF, pp. 23, 2i. 27. 
22 TF, pp. 26-29. 
24 TT, p. 68. 
23 TF, pp. 36-37. 
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This is further betrayed by the illustrations of simultaneous cause 
and effect that Al-GhazZli gives in the discussion of essential priority. 
These examples appear elsewhere in Al-GhazZli’s Tuhcif~t and other 
writings 25 and come in discussions of necessary causation and of vo- 
luntary as against necessary acts. In  particular, the illustration of the 
shadow’s movement that is simultaneous with the movement of the 
person suggests what was in the mind of Al-Ghazdi when he gaye that 
example. That the shadow is the necessary consequence of a man is 
given by Al-Ghazsli at the beginning of the third discussion. There 
Al-Ghazili attacks the philosophers’ theory that God creates by neces- 
sity. I n  explaining what the philosophers mean by this Al-GhazHli 
reports that the philosophers think that God must create the world just 
as the sun must give its light and just as the person necessitates his 
shadow. 26 
Thus, in the proof, the central metaphysical issue is the nature of 
God’s causality rather than the nature of time, and it is the nature of 
God’s causality that is the fundamental issue in conflict between the 
philosophers and the ,4shcarites. 27 
SUM MARY 
The proof is a disjunctive syllogism, and only as a disjunctive syl- 
logism can it be regarded as a complete argument for the world’s pre- 
eternity. The argument from time in itself does not prove the world’s 
pre-eternity. IYhat it does proye, is that God’s priority cannot be tem- 
poral, so disproving one of the two alternatives in the premise. By 
disproving this alternative, it proves the other, God’s essential priority. 
The conclusion that the world is eternal is a consequence of this and the 
implied premise that God is eternal. When it is shown that the argument 
from time in itself does not prove the world’s pre-eternity, the proof is 
absolved from an apparent circularity. Analysis show that the central 
metaphysical issue in the proof is not the nature of time, but rather the 
nature of God’s causality. 
A n n  Arbor, Michigan 
University of Michigan, MICHAEL E. h‘fARhlUR.4 
2ii TF, pp. 1 0 j - g ;  Al-Iqt i jdd fi-I-ICtiqhd (Cairo, no date). pp. 45-46. 
27 For an incisive treatment of this issue see Majid Fakhq-, Islamic Orcosiona- 
TF,  p. 97. 
lisrn (London, 1958). 
